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Aesthetic Judgment and the Public Sphere
in the Thought of Hannah Arendt
There never has been any ›aestheticization‹ of politics in 
the modern age because politics is aesthetic in principle.
Jacques Rancière1
A central question in this volume is the relationship between aesthetic practices and 
the constitution of a public sphere or counter-publics.2 What makes the work of 
Hannah Arendt relevant is her tenacious insistence that aesthetic judgment, and in 
particular Kant’s account of it in the third Critique3, is similar in structure to political 
judgment. Political judgments share the structure of aesthetic judgments, Arendt 
argues, insofar as both make an appeal to universality while eschewing truth criteria 
and the subsumption under rules or concepts that characterize logical judgments 
(e.g. the syllogism: All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Socrates is mortal).4
Arendt’s insistence that political like aesthetic claims cannot be truth claims has 
led Jürgen Habermas to accuse her of aestheticizing politics, that is, of identifying 
this realm with opinions that cannot be subjected to rational processes of validation 
anymore than we can validate judgments of taste. Arendt’s turn to Kant’s account 
of aesthetic judgment in the third Critique, Habermas maintains, is symptomatic of 
her refusal to provide a ›cognitive foundation‹ for politics and public debate. This 
leaves »a yawning abyss between knowledge and opinion that cannot be closed with 
arguments.«5 Taking up Habermas’s critique, Ronald Beiner, editor of Arendt’s 
Kant Lectures, reiterates the problems associated with »the all-important contrast 
between persuasive judgment and compelling truth« in Arendt’s thought and won-
ders why she failed to recognize that »all human judgments, including aesthetic (and 
certainly political) judgments, incorporate a necessary cognitive dimension.« (You 
will be a better judge of art if you know something about the art you are judging.) A 
Kantian approach, which excludes knowledge from political judgment, says Beiner, 
»renders one incapable of speaking of ›uninformed‹ judgment and of distinguish-
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ing differential capacities for knowledge so that some persons may be recognized as 
more qualified, and some as less qualified, to judge.«6
Arendt might respond to this critique by turning to a passage from Cicero, cited 
in her Kant lectures, in which he tells us »how little difference there is between the 
learned and the ignorant in judging«,7 or by reminding us that each individual, with-
out expertise, should be, and indeed is, capable of judging for herself. She might re-
mind us of why it matters for a democratic society that we hold fast to that picture of 
the ordinary character of judging. Before exploring the possibility of such a rebuttal, 
however, let us try to understand better the critique: we can never decide what counts 
as a legitimate judgment if we accept the (Kantian) distinction between cognitive 
judgments of the intellect or understanding, which are based on objective principle 
or law, and non-cognitive judgments of taste, which are based on nothing more than 
feelings of pleasure or displeasure. Because Arendt accepts this distinction, say her 
critics, she severs the link between reflective judgment and rational argument: she 
misconstrues rational debate and all truth claims as forms of compulsion which, in 
their difference from so-called mere opinion, are antipolitical in nature.8
Does Arendt in fact severs the link between argument and judgment? In my view, 
the critical charge entirely misses the mark. Arendt’s deep suspicion of a cognitively-
based practice of political judgment is not based on a naïve concept of logical reason-
ing. Her point is not to exclude so-called rational discourse or knowledge claims from 
the practice of aesthetic or political judgment – as if something or someone could 
stop us from making arguments in public contexts – but to press us to think about 
what we are doing when we reduce the practice of politics or judgment to the contest 
of better arguments. She disputes not the idea of argument as such but rather the as-
sumption (central to Habermas’ discourse ethics) that agreement in procedures for 
making arguments ought to produce agreement in conclusions, hence agreement in 
the political realm can be reached in the manner of giving proofs. Arendt is struggling 
with a difficult problem to which her critics, focused as they are on the rational adju-
dication of political claims, are blind: our deep sense of necessity in human affairs. If 
Arendt brackets the legitimation problematic that dominates the thought of Haber-
mas, it is because she sees in our practices of justification a strong tendency towards 
compulsion, which, in turn, destroys the particular qua particular and, with it, the 
very space in which political speech (including arguments) can appear.9 What shapes 
Arendt’s critique of the public realm as a rationally-driven culture of argument is a 
conception of politics as a practice of freedom. She sees how we tend to run the space 
of reasons into the space of causes: logical reasoning is transformed from a dialogic 
tool of thought, with which we aim at agreement, into a monologic tool of thought, 
with which we compel it. What Habermas calls »the rationality claim immanent in 
speech« risks becoming what Wittgenstein calls »the hardness of the logical must.«10
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I suggested earlier that, according to Arendt, political judgments have the sub-
jective, rather than objective, validity of aesthetic judgments. What does that mean 
exactly? And how is this subjective validity different from what her critics call ra-
tional discourse? We can begin to answer the first question by recalling that, for 
Arendt, both political claims and aesthetic claims are practices of reflective judgment 
in which, by contrast with what Kant calls a determinate judgment, the rule is not 
given.11 In the absence of a concept we are confronted with the particular as something 
radically singular, i.e., not subsumable under a rule. As Arendt writes in her Kant lec-
tures: »If you say, ›What a beautiful rose!‹ you do not arrive at this judgment by first 
saying, ›All roses are beautiful, this flower is a rose, hence this rose is beautiful‹.«12 
What confronts you in a reflective judgment is not the general category ›rose‹, but the 
particular, this rose. As Beiner correctly puts it, »reflective judgment means attending 
to the unique qualities of the particular, to the particular qua particular, rather than 
simply subsuming particulars under some universal formula. Or, as Arendt would 
put it, judgment involves attending to the particular as an end in itself – that is, as a 
singular locus of meaning that isn’t reducible to universal causes or universal con-
sequences.«13 That this rose is beautiful is not given in the universal nature of roses. 
There is nothing necessary about the beauty of this rose. The claim about beauty is 
not grounded in a property of the object, which could be objectively ascertained (as 
is the case with cognitive judgments); such a claim belongs to the structure of feeling 
rather than concepts (i.e., sensus communis, discussed below).14 This rose is judged to 
be beautiful; »beauty is not a property of the flower itself«,15 as Kant says, but only an 
expression of the pleasure felt by the judging subject in the mode of apprehending it.
In what follows I argue that we should take seriously Arendt’s reliance on Kant’s 
claim that, in an aesthetic judgment, »we feel our freedom«,16 for this foregrounds 
the fundamentally aesthetic character of politics. To say with Jacques Rancière that 
»politics is aesthetic in principle« is not to exclude, as Arendt’s critics accuse, ratio-
nality or the place of arguments in the public realm. It is rather to rethink the sort of 
rationality a political claim or judgment has, and the place of feeling in that kind of 
rationality. At the end of the day, what Arendt’s deliberative democratic critics fear 
is that, if all we have are feelings and opinions, we will have no way of distinguish-
ing between rhetorical speech (addressed to the passions) and rational speech (ad-
dressed to reason). As we shall see, this worry is as old as Western philosophy.
The Rhetorical Basis of Rational Speech
»Wherever people judge the things of the world that are common to them, there is 
more implied in their judgments than these things. By his manner of judging, the 
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person discloses to an extent also himself, what kind of person he is, and this disclo-
sure, which is involuntary, gains in validity to the degree that it has liberated itself 
from individual idiosyncrasies.«17 Arendt introduces two ideas here that are central 
to her account of judgment: (1) the act of judging the objects of the common world 
creates significant relations among judging persons, relations which disclose, as 
Arendt says in the next sentence of text, »who one is«, a public rather than private 
persona; (2) this disclosure of oneself as a judging person, how one judges, obtains 
validity (i.e., solicits the agreement of other judging persons) to the extent that it at-
tains impartiality (i.e., takes those others into account).
What one discovers in the act of judging, says Arendt, is both one’s differences 
with some judging persons and one’s commonalities with others. »We all know very 
well how quickly people recognize each other, and how unequivocally they can feel 
that they belong (or do not belong) to each other, when they discover (or fail to dis-
cover) a kinship in questions of what pleases and displeases.«18 Based in the activity 
of taste (»the it-pleases-or-displeases-me«), judging allows differences and common-
alities to emerge that are by no means given in advance of the act itself. Judging may 
well call into question my sense of community with some persons and reveal a new 
sense of community with others. This discovery of community is not guaranteed by 
the kind of rule-following associated with a »determinate judgment«, i.e., a judgment 
which »is logical, because its predicate is a given objective concept«,19 a judgment in 
which a particular is subsumed under a universal.20 Such rule-following, says Arendt, 
compels everyone who has the power of reason and could be done in solitude.
Deeply critical of the subjectivism (solipsism and skepticism) of modernity, 
Arendt’s turn to aesthetic judgment is based on the fundamental reality of the human 
condition, namely plurality. Arendt refuses to ground intersubjectivity in shared 
human nature (e.g., rationality) or, for that matter, in shared experience (e.g., class, 
ethnic, or national belonging).21 What she understands by plurality is more than an 
ontological condition, the fact that »men, not Man inhabit the earth.« Understood as 
political concept, plurality is something of which we need to take account when we 
decide how this shared world of ours will look and what will count as part of it. Judg-
ing is the activity that enables us to take account of plurality in this political sense. 
Following Kant’s distinction between judgments of taste and logical judgments,22 
Arendt develops the idea that whereas the latter, like the syllogism, compels every-
one who has the power of reason and could just as well be discovered on one’s own, 
the kind of validity at stake in political like aesthetic judgments requires not simply 
that one be in agreement with one’s own self (logic’s principle of non-contradiction, 
L.Z.), but »(…) consist(s) of being able to ›think in the place of everybody else‹.«23 
Such judgments, then, are by nature intersubjective and involve debate between in-
dividuals and groups over the ways the world is to be understood.
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The worldly relations that the practice of judging without a rule creates turn cru-
cially on the ability to see the same thing from multiple points of view, an ability 
which, in Arendt’s telling, is identical with what it means to see politically (»die Sa-
chen wirklich von verschiedenen Seiten zu sehen, und das heißt politisch«)24. The 
origins of this political way of seeing lie in »Homeric objectivity« (i.e., the ability 
to see the same thing from opposite points of view: to see the Trojan War from the 
standpoint of both of its greatest protagonists, Achilles and Hector).25 What trans-
forms this Homeric way of seeing into the ability to see from multiple points of view 
is nothing more than the daily practice of public speech, 
citizens talking with one another. In this incessant talk the Greeks dis- 
covered that the world we have in common is usually regarded from an infi-
nite number of standpoints, to which correspond the most diverse points of 
view. In a sheer inexhaustible flow of arguments, as the Sophists presented 
them to the citizenry of Athens, the Greek learned to exchange his own view-
point, his own ›opinion‹ – the way the world appeared and opened up to him 
(…) – with those of his fellow citizens. Greeks learned to understand – not 
to understand one another as individual persons, but to look upon the same 
world from one another’s standpoint, to see the same in very different and 
frequently opposing aspects.26
It would be easy to mistake what Arendt means by the »exchange of opinions« and 
the »inexhaustible flow of arguments, as the Sophists presented them«, for a concep-
tion of speech as rhetorical, where rhetoric is understood as the mere form (com-
posed of tropes and figures) that makes a certain content (composed of rational 
premises and ultimate principles [archai]) more persuasive to one’s interlocutor. 
»Incessant talk« would, on this interpretation, be an expression of the various guises 
that rhetoric takes in its attempt to bring an interlocutor to see something that, if 
human reason operated as most Western philosophers think it should, she would 
grasp by following logical rules. To be human is to be condemned, as it were, to 
politics understood as incessant talk and thus rhetoric.
What distinguishes Arendt’s account of political speech from the idea of rhetoric 
as a technique of persuasion is her stubborn insistence that this speech is composed 
not of truths dressed up in rhetorical form but of opinions, i.e., of an »it appears to 
me«27 – nothing more. In contrast to this political speech, she writes, is »the philo-
sophical form of speaking (… which is) concerned with knowledge and the finding 
of truth and therefore demands a process of compelling proof.«28 This process en-
tails the rule-following of logical reasoning: the deduction from premises which are 
apodictic and whose classic instance is the syllogism.
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I said earlier that Arendt has been criticized, in the words of Habermas, for »the 
all-important contrast (she draws) between persuasive judgment and compelling 
truth«, a contrast that radically excludes »the process of reaching agreement about 
practical (political) questions as rational discourse.«29 Ernesto Grassi – a contem-
porary of Arendt and, with her, a participant in Heidegger’s famous Marburg semi-
nar on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics – raises important questions about the very 
nature of rational discourse and its status in the philosophical tradition. According 
to that tradition, »to resort to images and metaphors, to the full set of implements 
proper to rhetoric«, writes Grassi, »merely serves to make it ›easier‹ to absorb ratio-
nal truth.«30 Turning the tables on the view that rhetorical speech is not only inferior 
to rational or philosophical speech but distinct from it, he argues: 
To prove (apo-deiknumi) means to show something to be something, on the 
basis of something. To have something through which something is shown 
and explained definitively is the foundation of our knowledge. Apodictic, de-
monstrative speech is the kind of speech which establishes the definition of 
phenomenon by tracing it back to ultimate principles, or archai. It is clear 
that the first archai of any proof and hence of knowledge cannot be proved 
themselves because they cannot be the object of apodictic, demonstrative, 
logical speech; otherwise they would not be first assertions. Their non-deriv-
able, primary character is evident from the fact that we neither can speak nor 
comport ourselves without them, for both speech and human activity simply 
presuppose them. But if the original assertions are not demonstrable, what is 
the character of the speech in which we express them? Obviously this type of 
speech cannot have a rational-theoretical character.31
Grassi’s answer is simple but significant: he shows that the ›indicative‹ or allusive 
(semeinein) speech that grounds philosophical or rational speech »provides the very 
framework within which the proof can come into existence at all.« This indicative 
speech »is immediately a ›showing‹ – and for this reason ›figurative‹ or ›imagina-
tive‹, and thus in the original sense ›theoretical‹ (theorein – i.e., to see). It is meta-
phorical, i.e., it shows something which has a sense, and this means that to the figure, 
to that which is shown, the speech transfers (metapherein) a signification; in this 
way the speech which realizes this showing ›leads before the eyes‹ (phainesthai) a 
significance.« The premises of philosophical or rational speech (i.e., the very thing 
reason grasps, the ground for every deduction and every argument) »is and must 
be in its structure an imaginative language.«32 This conclusion radically alters the 
relationship of rational (philosophical) speech and rhetorical (political) speech and 
with it the relationship of structures of feeling, associated with aesthetics, and those 
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of reason, associated with argument. »The term ›rhetoric‹ assumes a fundamentally 
new significance; ›rhetoric‹ is not, nor can it be the art, the technique of an exterior 
persuasion; it is rather the speech which is the basis of rational thought.«33
Grassi’s conclusion does not deny that persuasion belongs to rhetoric, he sim-
ply refuses to define rhetoric as a technique or tool of an »exterior persuasion«, i.e., 
the mere form which otherwise purely rational arguments must take if they are to 
strike one’s interlocutor with the force of truth. What distinguishes rational speech 
from rhetorical speech, then, is not that the former proceeds from premises which 
are, in Arendt’s vivid description of logical reasoning, like iron ›laws‹ that »are ulti-
mately rooted in the structure of the human brain (… and which) possess (…) the 
same force of compulsion as the driving necessity which regulates the function of 
our bodies.«34 Grassi would question not the sense of necessity Arendt describes but 
its source: necessity lies not in the ultimate principles or archai from which logical 
reasoning proceeds, let alone in the universal structure of the human brain, but in 
the images and figures that generate belief. What gives us the sense of necessity, what 
»holds us captive« is, as Wittgenstein would say, »a picture.«35 I hasten to add here 
that this picture is not, as the archai of rational (philosophical) speech pretend to be, 
necessary and universally valid apart from time and place; on the contrary, the pic-
ture has meaning and necessity only as part of a praxis, which is to say, it can change 
with the times. The fact that rhetoric is a praxis (i.e., concrete individuals talking 
to each other in specific contexts) is why the philosophical tradition, in the quest 
for a timeless, universal Truth, rejected it.36 In Arendt’s telling, it is a central task of 
judgment to loosen just this sense of timeless Truth and necessity in human affairs, 
especially the objective necessity of history. And such loosening requires different 
images and practices, new ways of producing meaning.
Learning to See Politically
As I suggested earlier, Arendt formulates the faculty of political judgment in terms 
of the ability to see the same object from multiple perspectives. This way of seeing 
(what the Greeks called »insight«), she writes in Was ist Politik?, creates a kind of 
»freedom of movement in the mental world that parallels exactly the freedom of 
movement in the physical world.«37 Indeed, »political freedom in its highest form 
coincides with this insight«, that is, the ability to see from standpoints not one’s own. 
Arendt explicitly sets this ability to see from multiple perspectives against what she 
calls the »tricks of the Sophists«, namely the strategy of turning arguments around, 
all the better to conclude, as the ancient skeptics held, that no judgment is possible.38 
However vital the Sophists were for attenuating dogmatism and teaching the skill 
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of public speaking, writes Arendt, at a certain point what becomes »important is 
not, that one can turn arguments around and assertions on their head, but that one 
developed the ability really to see things from multiple perspectives, and that means 
politically.«39 In these passages Arendt recognizes the value of reasoned argument 
and the raising of doubts in the constitution of the public realm, but her account of 
judgment turns on the difference between being compelled by the better argument, 
or doubting that any compelling argument can be made (skepticism), and learning 
to see what the world looks like to all who share it. This difference of emphasis pulls 
her account in the direction both of Grassi’s recovery of the humanist tradition’s 
conception of rhetoric and of Wittgenstein’s notion of the pictures that ›ground‹ 
our language-games. She emphasizes what it means to see differently, to form a dif-
ferent picture.
Rhetorical speech, shows something, and thus is figurative or imaginative in 
the original sense of ›theoretical‹ – (theorein – i.e., to see). It »leads before the eyes 
(phainesthai)«, writes Grassi. »Furthermore, if rationality is identified with the pro-
cess of clarification, we are forced to admit that the primal clarity of principles is 
not rational (i.e., grounded) and recognize that the corresponding language in its 
indicative structure has an ›evangelic‹ character, in the original Greek sense of this 
word, i.e., ›noticing‹.«40 This helps make sense of Arendt’s claim that judgment en-
tails learning to see from other points of view, that it is a faculty one develops (i.e., 
a skill) in the practice of political (rhetorical) speech, the exchange of opinions. 
What I see from those viewpoints is not the apodictic character of an argument, the 
certainty of its premises (though I may come to see – i.e., be persuaded by – those 
too); rather, I see (i.e., am affected by) what, in Grassi’s words, »›comes before‹ and 
provides that which deduction can never discover«: the images that make up »the 
basis or framework of rational argument.«41 Foregrounded in a practice of judgment 
based in rhetorical speech, then, is affect or feeling, which is why Arendt turns to 
Kant’s account of judgments of taste (the »it-pleases-or-displeases-me«) in the third 
Critique, and not to his account of practical reason in the second, or to some version 
of the Aristotelian notion of phronesis, which is the usual alternative that is com-
monly recommended by her otherwise puzzled critics.
I said earlier that aesthetic judgment never has the validity of cognitive or scien-
tific propositions. To say that such judgments are not rational, as Arendt’s critics do, 
would be to concede a rather narrow understanding of what rationality is, namely a 
form of thinking based on giving proofs. This includes not only the kind of rational-
ity Habermas accuses Arendt of uncritically inheriting from Kant’s first Critique, but 
also the practical rationality that he associates with the central role of arguments in 
a discourse ethics. Following Stanley Cavell’s reading of the third Critique, we might 
question the idea that rationality is a matter of reaching agreement in conclusions on 
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the basis of agreement in procedures. Kant’s whole point, after all, was to respond 
to critics like Hume, who claimed that the notorious lack of agreement in aesthetic 
judgments shows they lack rationality. Though Kant refuted the idea that aesthetics 
could ever be a science or that such judgments could be proved, he insisted that, 
when we judge aesthetically, our claim is not merely subjective. In contrast to claims 
about what is agreeable (or not), a judgment of taste is characterized by subjective 
(not objective) necessity: lacking concepts, it exhibits a necessity that »can only be 
called exemplary, i.e., a necessity of the assent of everyone to a judgment that is re-
garded as an example of a rule that we are unable to state.«42
Being no mere claim about what is agreeable (to me), such judgments impute the 
assent of others: e.g., others too ought to judge this rose beautiful. Whether others do 
so judge is another matter. In any case the validity of my judgment does not depend 
on their empirical assent. But if the validity of my judgment does not depend on their 
assent and certainly cannot compel it on the basis of proofs, why bother exchanging 
views at all? »For if it is granted that we can quarrel about something, then there must 
be some hope for us to arrive at agreement about it«, as Kant puts it.43 This hope 
indicates that such judgments are not merely subjective, as Kant concludes, but also, 
as Cavell suggests, that the debate lives on despite the lack of guarantee of reaching 
agreement. The possibility of reaching agreement is not excluded (contra what Jean-
Francois Lyotard’s reading of Kant assumes), but the validity of an aesthetic judg-
ment in no way depends on it. We expect people to support their judgments, but 
even if we agree with their arguments we need not agree with their conclusion. For 
example, I can accept your argument about why a certain painting is beautiful (e.g., 
its unique place in the history of art, the vivid use of color, the depth of perspective, 
etc.) and still disagree with your judgment of beauty. That refusal may make my sense 
of taste deficient in your eyes, but not in the sense of being mistaken.
This suggests that the rationality of such judgments is of a different kind. As 
Stephen Mulhall observes, Cavell takes up Kant’s understanding of the subjective 
validity of aesthetic judgments to argue that rationality is a matter of the existence 
of patterns (of support, objection, response) rather than of agreement (in conclu-
sions); he is suggesting that logic or rationality might be more fruitfully thought of as 
a matter of agreement in patterns rather than an agreement in conclusions. Whether 
the particular patterns or procedures are such that those competent in following 
them are guaranteed to reach an agreed conclusion is part of what distinguishes one 
type or aspect of rationality from another; but what distinguishes rationality from 
irrationality in any domain is agreement in – a commitment to – patterns or proce-
dures of speaking and acting.44
Aesthetic judgments are arguable, in other words, but in a particular way. They 
belong to the interlocution Kant calls streiten (to quarrel) rather than disputieren (to 
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dispute), that is, the kind of interlocution that, if it generates agreement, does so on 
the basis of persuasion rather than irrefutable proofs.45 The issue, then, cannot be 
that aesthetic judgments lack rationality. In the third Critique, Kant no more ruled 
out giving reasons for our aesthetic judgments than does Arendt in her appropria-
tion of him.46 Someone who is unable to support her judgments is not engaging in 
aesthetic (Kant) or political (Arendt) judgment at all, but merely stating a subjec-
tive preference. What he ruled out, rather, was the idea that reasons could compel 
others to agree. Criteria are to be considered when choosing between competing 
judgments, but these criteria can never function as proof that a judgment is correct. 
Consequently, there is no single argument that can or should persuade everyone 
capable of reason, regardless of standpoint or context, that a particular judgment is 
superior (e.g., more rational) than another.
To attempt to persuade with argument in the political realm, says Arendt, is »to 
give an account – not to prove, but to be able to say how one came to an opinion, 
and for what reasons one formed it.«47 She does not dispute the idea (precious to 
Habermas’s notion of the practical kind of rationality presupposed in communica-
tion »oriented toward mutual understanding«) that speakers should – he would say 
must – be able, if asked, to justify their own speech acts. What she disputes, rather, 
is the idea that agreement among interlocutors follows necessarily from the ability – 
once each one has heard all relevant views – to defend their own views. Arendt takes 
up Kant’s insight that we can well follow and even accept the arguments brought to 
defend a particular aesthetic judgment without having to accept the conclusion. In-
deed »the fact that anyone who can follow an argument need not accept the conclu-
sion – even if she doesn’t find anything definitely wrong with it«, as Stephen Mulhall 
observes, is what led »Kant to claim that the imputed universality of aesthetic judg-
ment does not spring from (the application of) a concept, that it cannot be thought 
of as objective universality.«48 Disagreement – even deep disagreement – is possible, 
though neither side is making a mistake or failing to grasp that a particular judgment 
is well-supported. That is not least because what is at stake in aesthetic as in political 
life is not what is objectively true, but our human way of valuing things we hold in 
common, not that something is so, but that it is so, as Cavell would put it.49
Like aesthetic judgments, political judgments too are arguable, then, but in a very 
specific way. The style of ›argument‹ that is proper to the political realm is not dispu-
tieren, demonstration by proofs, which would compel on the basis of already accepted 
premises, but streiten, a quarrel in which one interlocutor, positing or imputing the 
agreement of others, presents how ›it-seems-to-me.‹50 We try to persuade others of 
our views. But the failure to reach agreement, for Arendt as for Kant, in no ways sig-
nals a failure to communicate rationally or to follow agreed upon conventions for ra-
tional argumentation. I may well follow and even accept your argument and still not 
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agree with your conclusion. This sounds strange only because we are so accustomed 
to thinking that agreement in conclusions follows from agreement in premises and 
procedures, follows in such a way that anyone who accepted the premises and proce-
dures but not the conclusion is either making a mistake or is mentally deficient. And 
in the case of judgments in which concepts are applied, this is more or less the case. 
But the poet who judges his poem beautiful, contrary to the judgments of his 
audience, may accept their criticisms based on the conventions (e.g., rhyme, meter, 
etc.) of poetry – yet stubbornly hold to his view.51 The signers of the 1848 Declaration 
of Sentiments, who judge men and women to be created equal, contrary to the judg-
ments of the Founders and most nineteenth-century Americans, may well accept 
the criticisms that men and women are different by nature – yet stubbornly hold to 
their view. What we hold to in the face of the apparent contradiction between these 
moments of agreement is neither illogical nor irrational, but rather an expression of 
values that have not yet found expression in the sense of a determinate concept. To 
anticipate the argument that follows, what we hold to in political as in aesthetic judg-
ments (as the claim to gender equality suggests) is not necessarily something that is 
irreducibly non-conceptual (as, say, Jean François Lyotard, in his preference for the 
Kantian sublime, argues), but rather something that is an imaginative extension of 
a concept beyond its ordinary use in cognitive judgments and knowledge claims, 
that is, beyond its characteristic role, which is to introduce interests. Whether we 
eventually abandon an earlier judgment on the basis of sharpening our own power 
of reflective judgment (as Kant’s poet does) or hold to it in the face of a world that 
once declared us scandalous (as the signers of the Declaration did), each of us must 
judge for ourselves and try to persuade others of our views, and this will involve an 
imaginative »exhibition of the concept (e.g. of equality)«, to speak with Kant, that 
»expands the concept itself in an unlimited way.«52 
This ability to persuade others of one’s views depends on facility neither in logic 
nor rhetoric – ›rhetoric‹ understood, that is, in the highly caricatured way in which 
Arendt’s critics understand that term, i.e., as something that (as Kant himself com-
plained) blinds us to what is rational in an argument. One may well have the so-
called »force of the better argument« and fail to convince one’s interlocutors, and 
not because they lack competence, i.e., fail to understand what a good argument 
is. The ability to persuade, rather, depends upon the capacity to elicit criteria that 
speak to the particular case at hand and in relation to particular interlocutors. It is 
an ability, fundamentally creative and imaginative, to project a word like ›beautiful‹ 
or a phrase like ›created equal‹ into a new context in ways that others can accept, not 
because they (necessarily) already agree with the projection (or would have to agree 
if they are thinking properly), but because they are brought to see something new, 
a different way of framing their responses to certain objects and events. Arguments 
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are put forward like the examples that Kant holds to be the irreducible ›go-carts‹ of 
an aesthetic judgment: they exhibit connections that cannot be rationally deduced 
from given premises. If an argument has ›force,‹ it is more as the vehicle of an imagi-
native ›seeing‹ (to stay with Arendt’s own language) than an irrefutable logic. And 
its force is never separable from the person making the judgment and the context 
into which she speaks. There can no more be the final or conclusive argument for 
the equality of the sexes than there can be the final and conclusive argument for the 
beautiful. Every political or aesthetic argument must be articulated in relation to a 
set of particulars which vary according to time and place and, at the same time, ap-
peal to what we have in common.
Sensus Communis
I said earlier that the practice of judging in the absence of a concept raises the specter 
of particularism and relativism. Citing Kant, Arendt emphasizes that judgments of 
taste, far from being private and subjective (de gustibus non disputandum est) have 
»subjective validity«, which entails »an anticipated communication with others with 
whom I know I must finally come to some agreement.«53 This anticipated agreement 
relies on common sense understood as sensus communis, »the very opposite of ›pri-
vate feelings‹«, sensus privates.54 »Common sense«, she writes, »discloses to us the na-
ture of the world insofar as it is a common world; we owe to it the fact that our strictly 
private and ›subjective‹ five senses and their sensory data can adjust themselves to a 
nonsubjective and ›objective‹ world which we have in common with others.«55
What Arendt means by sensus communis may be akin to what Wittgenstein 
means by our prereflective »agreement in judgments«, which underlies our practices 
of justification, and which is itself a practice not susceptible to or in need of proof 
– or, following Grassi, what Vico means by »a judgment without reflection« – than 
it is to Kant’s idea of sensus communis as a transcendental, a priori principle, which 
grounds the universal validity of judgments of taste (and which, therefore, is in no 
way the product of some social process, of deliberation or agreement in a particular 
community).56 Some readers of Arendt accuse her of losing sight of the a priori (not 
to mention rational) character of the Kantian sensus communis, and of treating judg-
ment as if it entailed reaching actual agreement with others or were based on some 
form of empirical sociality.57 Judgment according to Arendt would then entail little 
more than striving for agreement with a community’s norms. Rhetoric, understood 
in its conventional sense as a sophistic technique of persuasion, would then rear its 
ugly head, threatening to lure us back into the Platonic cave, where we are unable to 
distinguish images from the things themselves, opinion from truth.
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Clearly Arendt, whose work on totalitarianism animated her account of judg-
ment, did not wish to limit judgment or the sensus communis in this way. Like Kant 
she recognizes that empirical communities can be deeply flawed in their judgments. 
Furthermore, to judge according to the common understanding of a given commu-
nity is, as Kant himself says, »to judge not by feeling but always by concepts, even 
though these concepts are usually only principles conceived obscurely.«58 For Kant, 
however, what makes concepts obscure is itself often connected to feeling: it is none 
other than rhetoric or the arts of speech, which, in the Critique of Judgment, he ac-
cuses of being a perfect cheat and of »merit(ing) no respect whatsoever.« Rhetoric 
stands accused of being »the art of transacting a serious business of the understand-
ing as if it were a free play of the imagination.« As Robert Dostal correctly observes, 
»it is just this play of imagination that Arendt wishes to affirm.« In contrast to Kant, 
for whom the ars oratoria, »insofar as this is taken to mean the art of persuasion« 
deceives us by means of a »beautiful illusion« and makes our »judgments unfree«, 
writes Dostal, Arendt affirms that »the rhetorical arguments of our fellow spectators 
free us.«59 Rhetoric – understood not as a refined art of speaking mastered by the 
few (to instruct the rationally deficient or to deceive the many, as the philosophers 
would have it) but as a quotidian practice of public speech, citizens talking to one 
another – is, for Arendt, the condition of our freedom. We are free when we speak 
and act, not before and not after, as she tells us in What is Freedom? But there is 
another sense in which we could say that, according to Arendt, the rhetorical argu-
ments or opinions of others free us: they open up the world to us in new ways. That 
opening up is dependent on the faculty of imagination, a faculty which Arendt’s 
Kantian (and Aristotelian) critics generally want to keep under the control of reason 
(albeit practical) and the understanding, lest imagination leads us astray with the 
demigods and pundits who, using the art of rhetoric, disguise opinions as truths.
To appreciate the imaginative or innovative character of rhetoric in the exchange 
of opinion we need to recognize that when we appeal to the sensus communis, »woo 
the assent of others«, we are appealing neither to a fixed set of opinions nor to an a 
priori principle. Sensus communis is not a set of rules one applies but what one ap-
peals to in judging; it marks the difference between what is and what is not commu-
nicable, i.e., what resonates (makes sense, in the ordinary meaning of that term) for 
others. Far from functioning to guarantee agreement in advance, sensus communis 
allows differences of perspective to emerge and become visible. Sensus communis, 
then, is not a static concept grounded in eternal truths but a creative force which 
generates our sense of reality and which is based in the figurative power of language, 
hence subject to change. By no means given in the nature of things, sensus commu-
nis or common sense, as Grassi following Vico and Cicero argues, »lies outside the 
rational process, within the sphere of ingenuity, so that it assumes an inventive char-
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acter«,60 it is based on »the activity of ingenium (which) consists in catching sight 
of relationships or similitudines among things.«61 These relationships are external 
to their terms, i.e., they are not given in the things themselves, but are a creation. 
They are »never eternally valid, never absolutely ›true‹, because they always emerge 
within limited situations bound in space and time; i.e., they are probable and seem 
to be true (verisimile), true only within the confine of the ›here‹ and ›now‹, in which 
the needs and problems that confront human beings are met.«62 Through this inge-
nious activity, what Cicero calls »semina virtutum«, writes Grassi, »we surpass what 
lies before us in sensory awareness.«63 In stark contrast to the deductive activity of 
logical reasoning, which »must restrict itself to finding what already is contained in 
the premises«,64 ingenium is the art of invention. It is the creative discovery of rela-
tionships among appearances which have no logical connection. Ingenium, then, 
produces something new. It is the basis for the discovery of community through the 
act of judging and it is deeply connected to the exercise of the imagination.
Following Grassi, imagination is much more than the faculty of re-presentation, 
i.e., the faculty of making present what is absent, which is »the reproductive imagina-
tion« in Kant. On the one hand, Arendt is clearly concerned with imagination as the 
faculty that gives me objects as representations so that I can be affected by them, but 
not in the direct way I am when the object is given to me by the senses. Imagination 
prepares the object so that I can reflect upon it, which is to say, judge it. It also allows 
me to visit standpoints not my own, creating the conditions for the relations of prox-
imity and distance that are vital to Arendt’s understanding of political space.65 »Imagi-
nation alone enables us to see things in their proper perspective«, she writes, »to put 
that which is too close at a certain distance so that we can see and understand it with-
out bias and prejudice, to be generous enough to bridge abysses of remoteness until 
we can see and understand everything that is too far away from us as though it were 
our own affair.«66 On the other hand, Arendt cites Kant’s observation that imagina-
tion brings together sensibility and understanding by »providing an image for a con-
cept«, a »schema«, in the absence of which there would be no experience in the Kan-
tian sense.67 Arendt continues: »Our sensibility seems to need imagination not only as 
an aid to knowledge but in order to recognize sameness in the manifold. As such it is 
the condition of all knowledge: the (in Kant’s words) ›synthesis of imagination‹, prior 
to apperception, is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experi-
ence.«68 This »synthesis of the manifold«, says Kant, »is the mere result of the power of 
imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should 
have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious.«69 This is 
Kant’s discovery in the first Critique of the »transcendental imagination« as a produc-
tive power, the discovery of an »unknown root« (»unbekannte Wurzel«) from which, 
according to Heidegger, he »recoiled« and subsumed under reason.70
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Although Arendt’s account of judgment does not really explore Kant’s account 
of imagination as a productive or generative force, she sees that it is crucially im-
portant to breaking the boundaries of identity-based experience, taking account of 
plurality, seeing from perspectives not one’s own. This is what makes imagination 
(rather than reason or understanding) the political faculty par excellence.
Political Imagination (or »Being and thinking in my own identity where 
actually I am not«)
We have seen that Arendt refigures the validity that is appropriate to democratic 
politics as unthinkable apart from plurality. For her critics, by contrast, validity ob-
tains when impartiality is achieved through the discursive adjudication of rational-
ity claims, that is, the separation of particular from general interests. Consequently, 
impartiality obtains when opinions and judgments are purified of interests that are 
strictly private – but what remains is a form of interest nonetheless, only now this 
interest is said to be rational and universal in a non-transcendental sense. Although 
Arendt too holds impartiality to be the condition of a properly political opinion or 
judgment, what she understands by impartiality is akin to what Kant means when he 
says that concepts cannot play any role in an aesthetic judgment because they refer 
to objects and introduce interest, that is, the pleasure or liking »we connect with the 
presentation of an object’s existence.« This interest is related to the object’s purpose, 
its ability to serve an end: »interest here refers to usefulness«, observes Arendt.71 
Concepts are to be excluded, according to Kant, because they entangle aesthetic – 
Arendt would say political – judgments in an economy of use and in a causal nexus. 
The »inability to think and judge a thing apart from its function or utility«, writes 
Arendt, indicates a »utilitarian mentality« and »philistinism.«72 She continues: »And 
the Greeks rightly suspected that this philistinism threatens (…) the political realm, 
as it obviously does because it will judge action by the same standards of utility which 
are valid for fabrication, demand that action obtain a pre-determined end and that it 
be permitted to seize on all means likely to further this end.«73 For Arendt, who held 
means-ends thinking to be a denial of the freedom exhibited in action and speech, 
the introduction of interests, be they private or general, introduce the instrumen-
tal attitude, means-ends thinking.74 If her critics cannot think the idea of disinter-
estedness in terms other than objective validity, it is because they are not centrally 
concerned, as she is, with the problem of freedom, and thus never see any need to 
relinquish the object as ground zero of every judgment. Accordingly, the relation 
among subjects is, for them, mediated through objects and thus through the exercise 
of reason and the faculty of the understanding and its application of concepts.
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Opinion formation, though not the same operation as judging, is a kind of pre-
cursor to judging, i.e., one’s ability to attain adequate disinterestedness in form-
ing an opinion will, in turn, manifest itself in one’s ability to judge without a rule. 
Opinion formation emerges in Arendt’s view only once we have no rules under 
which to subsume particulars. Like an aesthetic judgment of beauty, an opinion does 
not designate something in the object about which the opinion is held, but only how 
the subject is affected, i.e., opinion as »it appears to me.« The famous claim of the 
American Founding Fathers, »We hold these truths to be self evident etc.«, to take 
Arendt’s example, is a political opinion that tells us something about the values of 
the people who held it (e.g., their desire for freedom), not a statement of fact that tells 
us something about the objective equality of men.75 Likewise the brilliant rhetorical 
repetition with a difference that opens the founding American feminist text men-
tioned earlier, the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments, is an opinion in the aforemen-
tioned sense, rather than a statement of fact about the objective equality of women 
and men. More precisely, in both cases objective equality is expressed in the form of 
an opinion. Taken as part of the practice of judgment, political opinion formation 
is guided by a sense of necessity: others too ought to hold these truths to be self-evi-
dent. Whether others will so hold, of course, is a different matter, for the ›universal 
voice‹ that guides the formation of such an opinion is not a guarantee of an actual, 
empirical agreement based on the proper application of concepts. Each of us must 
form our own opinion, for such a guarantee does not exist. Were opinions formed in 
the manner of cognitive judgments, this would not be the case. Based in shared con-
cepts and criteria, cognitive judgments are comprehensive over objects and subjects, 
which is to say, as Kant argues, »others may see and observe for (us).«76
As no concept determines the formation of opinion according to Arendt, such 
formation cannot entail – not in the first place – the subject’s relation to the object, 
which defines cognitive judgments in Kant’s view. Rather, the relation to the object 
is mediated through the subject’s relation to the standpoints of other subjects or, 
more precisely, by taking the viewpoints of others on the same object into account. 
Arendt describes this intersubjective relation as »representative thinking«:
I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by 
making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, 
I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the 
actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the 
world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as 
though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and 
joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actu-
ally I am not. The more people’s standpoints I have present in my mind while 
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I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel 
and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for repre-
sentative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion.77
The Kantian name for representative thinking, Arendt adds, is »enlarged mentality« 
or, more exactly, an enlarged manner of thinking (»eine erweiterte Denkungsart«) 
whose condition of possibility is not the faculty of understanding, but imagina-
tion.78 It is this faculty, at work in seeing from the standpoints of other people, that 
keeps enlarged thought from becoming either an enlarged empathy or the majority 
opinion. Imagination is a means, writes Arendt, and I quote again, »to see things in 
their proper perspective, to be strong enough to put that which is too close at a cer-
tain distance so that we can see and understand it without bias and prejudice, to be 
generous enough to bridge abysses of remoteness until we can see and understand 
everything that is too far away from us as though it were our own affair.«79 Imagi-
nation mediates: it does not move above perspectives as if they were something to 
transcend in the name of pure objectivity, nor does it move among perspectives as if 
they were identities in need of our recognition or empathic projection; rather imagi-
nation enables »being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not.«80
To unpack this curious formulation of enlarged thinking let us consider the spe-
cial art upon which it is based, what Arendt calls »training the imagination to go 
visiting.«81 Commenting on this art of imaginatively occupying the standpoints of 
other people, Iris Marion Young argues that it assumes a reversibility in social posi-
tions that denies structured relations of power and ultimately difference. »Dialogue 
participants are able to take account of the perspective of others because they have 
heard those perspectives expressed«, writes Young, not because »the person judging 
imagines what the world looks like from other perspectives.«82 Likewise, Lisa Disch 
is critical of the notion that »a single person can imaginatively anticipate each one of 
the different perspectives that are relevant to a situation. It is this presupposition that 
reproduces an aspect of (the very) empathy (Arendt otherwise rejects in her account 
of representative thinking, L.Z.); it effects an erasure of difference.«83 Both Young 
and Disch agree, then, that the idea of enlarged thought must be based in actual 
dialogue, not imaginative dialogue. This »actual dialogue between real (rather than 
hypothetical interlocutors)«, as Beiner likewise observes, sets the parameters for the 
kind of validity or universality that is proper to political judgment and whose condi-
tion is common sense.84 We could qualify this critique and say that imagination is 
no substitute for hearing other perspectives but nonetheless necessary according to 
Arendt because, empirically speaking, we cannot possibly hear all relevant perspec-
tives. To do so, however, would be to accept the conception of imagination implicit 
in the critique, namely, that this faculty is at best a stand in for real objects, including 
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the actual opinions of other people, and at worst a distortion of those objects, in ac-
cordance with the interests of the subject exercising imagination.85
In contrast to the emphasis on actual dialogue and an ›interpersonal relation-
ship‹ (centered on mutual understanding or mutual recognition) in a ›discourse 
ethics‹, Arendt’s invokes imagination in order to develop reference to another, third 
perspective from which one observes, and attempts to see from, other standpoints 
but at a distance. The point after all is not to express empathy for, or achieve identi-
fication with, other people, but rather to enlarge one’s perspective such that one can 
judge. Arendt does not discount the importance of actual dialogue any more than 
Kant did, but rather emphasizes the unique position of outsideness from which we 
judge. It is this third perspective that Arendt had in mind when she claimed above 
that imaginative visiting involves, not the mutual understanding of »one another as 
individual persons«, but the understanding that involves coming to »see the same 
world from one another’s standpoint, to see the same in very different and frequently 
opposing aspects.« At stake is the difference between understanding another person 
and understanding the world, the world not as an object we cognize but »the space 
in which things become public«, as Arendt says.86 
For Arendt, the kind of understanding made possible by exercising imagination 
concerns our ability to see objects and events outside the economy of use and the 
causal nexus. »Being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not« is 
the position achieved not when, understanding another person (as in a discourse 
ethics), I yield my private to the general interest, but when I look at the world from 
multiple standpoints (not identity positions) to which I am always something of an 
outsider and, in this way, also something of an outsider to my self as an acting be-
ing.87 This is the position of the spectator that Arendt describes in her Kant lectures. 
The spectator is the one who, through the use of imagination, can reflect on the 
whole in a disinterested manner, that is, a manner free not simply from private in-
terest but from interest tout court, which is to say from any standard of utility what-
soever. Were the imagination merely reproductive and concept-governed, it might 
be possible to attain the kind of impartiality that Arendt’s readers associate with the 
position of the spectator, namely the impartiality of the general interest. But would 
one be poised to apprehend objects and events in their freedom?
Being so poised, Kant could express enthusiasm about the new, the world-his-
torical event of the French Revolution, although from the standpoint of a morally 
acting being, Kant said, he would have to condemn it. From the standpoint of the 
spectator, however, he could find in this event ›signs‹ of progress. These ›signs of 
history‹ are not facts that can be presented by the reproductive imagination in accor-
dance with the understanding and judged according to a rule of cognition. Rather, 
as David Carroll observes, such signs »have as their referent the future which they 
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in some sense anticipate but can in no way be considered to determine.«88 To the 
spectator, the French Revolution does not provide cognitive confirmation that man-
kind is progressing; rather, it inspires »hope«, as Arendt writes, by »opening up new 
horizons for the future.«89 As a world-historical event, the Revolution indicated what 
cannot be proved, but must be indicated: human freedom.
The freedom-affirming position of the spectator »does not tell one how to act«, 
writes Arendt of Kant’s enthusiasm.90 What one sees from this impartial standpoint, 
then, is not the general interest or anything that could be considered a guide to politi-
cal action or to further judgment. The judgment one makes as a spectator is in no way 
connected with an end. Indeed, »even if the end viewed in connection with this event 
(the Revolution) should not now be attained, even if the revolution or reform of a 
national constitution should finally miscarry«, Arendt cites Kant, nothing can destroy 
the hope that the event inspired.91 For a new event, from the perspective of the specta-
tor poised to apprehend it in its freedom, is not a means toward an empirical end of 
any kind, and thus the validity of the judgment in no way turns on the realization of 
an end. Rather, validity is here tied to an affirmation of freedom that expands the very 
peculiar kind of objectivity that Arendt associates with the political sphere, namely, 
the objectivity or sense of reality that turns on seeing an object or event from as many 
sides as possible. Like »the highest form of objectivity« that arose when Homer, set-
ting aside the judgment of History, sang the praise of both the Greeks and the Trojans, 
so too does Kant’s judgment of the French Revolution expand our sense of the real, for 
it refuses to judge on the basis of victory or defeat, of interest or end whatsoever.
The judgment that at once expands our sense of reality and affirms freedom is 
possible only once the faculties are »in free play«, as Kant puts it. Only where the 
imagination is not restrained by a concept (given by the understanding) or the moral 
law (given by reason) can such a judgment come to pass. And the French Revolution 
was for Kant a world-historical event for which we have no rule of cognition. In free 
play, the imagination is no longer in the service of the application of concepts. But 
the application of a concept was not the task Kant had in mind when he expressed en-
thusiasm for the French Revolution, which provided no concepts and no maxim for 
acting whatsoever. To judge objects and events in their freedom expands our sense of 
community, not because it tells us what is morally or politically justified and thus what 
we should do, but because it expands our sense of what is real or communicable.
Judging Creates Political Space
Though judgment is a way of constructing and discovering (the limits of) communi-
ty, this does not mean that it would or ought to translate into a blueprint for political 
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action. That judgment need not provide a guide for action and, in fact, may even be at 
radical odds with any maxim for action – as it was in Kant’s enthusiasm for the French 
Revolution – is crucial to Arendt’s claim that the spectator position is one from which 
we are able to see the whole without the mediation of a concept based on the presence 
of an interest. Spectators do not produce judgments that ought then serve as prin-
ciples either for action or for other judgments; they create, rather, the space in which 
the objects of political judgment, the actors and actions themselves, can appear, and 
in this sense alter our sense of what belongs in the common world. If the world (not 
nature but the human artifice), as Arendt argues, »is the space in which things become 
public«, then judging is a practice that alters that world, what we will count as public 
or political, what we will hear and see in it. In this space, created by judging, the ob-
jects of judgment appear: »The judgment of the spectator creates the space in [omit 
without] which no such objects could appear at all. The public realm is constituted 
by the critics and the spectators, not by the actors and the makers. And this critic and 
spectator sits in every actor«, writes Arendt;92 ›spectator‹ is not another person, but 
simply a different mode of relating to, or being in, the common world. This shift in 
emphasis amounts to a Copernican turn in the relationship of action to judgment: 
i.e., we have first not the actors but the spectators, not the objects of judgment but 
the practice of judgment. Arendt attributes it to Kant, but it is Hannah Arendt herself 
who discovers, in her idiosyncratic reading of Kant, that it is the judging activity of the 
spectators, not the object they judge or its maker, that creates the public space. 
Calling our attention to the activity of judging as formative of the public realm, 
Arendt emphasizes what aesthetic theory calls practices of reception. But she seems 
to discount the potentially transformative and generative contribution of the object 
of judgment itself as well as the creative activity of the artist, actor, or maker. Kant, 
by contrast with Arendt, emphasizes not only the spectators but the role of the art-
ist and the formative power of creative imagination, the ability to present objects 
in new, unfamiliar ways – what Kant called »genius.« In his discussion of ›aesthetic 
ideas‹ Kant describes the imagination as »very mighty when it creates, as it were, 
another nature out of the material that actual nature gives it.«93 Indeed, »we may 
even restructure experience«, adds Kant, »(and) in this process we feel our freedom 
from the law of association (which attaches to the empirical, i.e., reproductive) use 
of the imagination; for although it is under that law that nature lends us material, yet 
we can process that material into something quite different, namely into something 
that surpasses nature.«94 This faculty of presentation »prompts so much thought, 
but to which no determinate thought whatsoever, i.e., no (determinate) concept, can 
be adequate, so that no language can express it completely and allow us to grasp it.«95 
Such aesthetic presentations »strive toward something that lies beyond the bounds 
of experience« (hence they are called aesthetic ideas and are the counterpart of ratio-
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nal ideas), but they are presentations nonetheless. Rather than exhibiting that which 
is radically unpresentable (as is the case in the Kantian sublime), the faculty of pre-
sentation at work in the exhibition of aesthetic ideas »expands the concept itself in 
an unlimited way.«96 The imagination, in other words, can work on or order material 
in such a way that we are able to create out of it non-causal associations and even a 
new nature. Concepts themselves are not so much excluded as expanded, and this 
has important consequences for how we think about our own political (Arendt) or 
aesthetic (Kant) activity.
We might ask whether this concept-transforming activity of the imagination is 
confined to the activity of genius. Although Kant himself inclines to cast taste as the 
faculty that »clips its (genius’) wings«, bringing it in line with what is communicable 
(what others can follow and assent to), surely the spectator too – including the spec-
tator that exists in every actor or artist – is called upon to exert imagination in trying 
to comprehend a work. In this way, then, our sense of what is communicable is not 
static but dynamic. The imagination is, after all, in free play when we judge reflec-
tivity, not only when we create new objects of judgment. If Arendt associates the 
faculty of productive imagination exclusively with genius, applauding Kant’s sub-
ordination of genius to taste, that may be because she was determined to emphasize 
the importance of plurality in judging. In contrast to the solitary genius, »spectators 
exist only in the plural«,97 as she claimed, and the need to take account of plurality, 
of other views, is what distinguishes a political or aesthetic judgment from a logical 
or cognitive one. Arendt was concerned with the creation of the public, the space of 
the world in which the objects of judgment can appear. 
But of course a text such as the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments puts forward at 
once a judgment, which has been reached individually by each of its signers, and an 
imaginative ›object‹, which not only serves as the occasion for future judgments, 
but which stimulates the imagination of judging spectators and expands their sense 
of what is communicable, what they will count as part of the common world. Like 
a work of art, such a document is potentially defamiliarizing: working with what is 
communicable (e.g., the idea, already put forward in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, that all men are created equal) it expands our sense of what we can commu-
nicate (e.g., that women too can be included in the original idea of equality). Posit-
ing the agreement of all (»we hold these truths to be self-evident«) and not just its 
signers, such a document creatively (re)presents the concept of equality in a way 
that, to cite Kant on productive imagination again, »quickens the mind by opening 
up for it a view«98 that is excluded by every logical presentation of the concept of 
equality. It is this creative expansion of the concept that we miss whenever we talk 
about the logical extension of something like equality or rights. Every extension of a 
political concept always involves an imaginative opening up of the world that allows 
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us to see and articulate relations between things that have none (in any necessary, 
logical sense), to create relations that are external to their terms. Indeed, political 
relations are always external to their terms, and thus they always involve an imagina-
tive element, the ability to see or to forge new connections.
We can judge without a concept, exactly as Arendt held, then, because we are 
not limited to disputieren (i.e., agreement on the basis of proofs from established 
premises); we are capable of creating new forms or figures with which to make sense 
of objects and events. And we can argue about the meaning of those objects and 
events without declaring a Widerstreit, the impossibility of any agreement whatso-
ever. In this process of making sense or judging reflectively, we refuse to limit our-
selves to proofs based on concepts already given, and instead alter our sense of what 
is common or shared: we alter what Arendt calls the world. With time the forms and 
figures, given by the reflective judgment, also become ossified as rules (i.e., judg-
ments that serve as principles of judgment) which too, in turn, demand the response 
of imagination to break up the closure of rule-governed practices, unsettling their 
settled instantiation in a freedom-denying mode of common sense. That is why 
Arendt, like Kant, emphasizes judging as an activity, not judgments as the result of 
an activity, judgments which, being valid for all, could be extended beyond the activ-
ity of judging subjects and applied in rule-like fashion by other subjects.
What we affirm in a political judgment is experienced not as a cognitive com-
mitment to a set of rationally agreed upon precepts (as they are encoded in, say, a 
constitution – though it can be experienced as that too) but as pleasure, as shared 
sensibility. »We feel our freedom«, as Kant put it, when we judge aesthetically or, as 
Arendt shows, politically. For validity theorists, this shared sensibility will never be 
enough to secure the actual experience and institutions of freedom – or it will be too 
much, leading to fanaticism in the name of freedom. If the pleasure that obtains in a 
judgment arises not in relation to the object but to nothing more than the judgment 
itself, then we are thrown back on ourselves and our own practice: we take pleasure 
in what we hold (e.g., that these truths are self-evident). What gives us pleasure is 
how we judge, that is to say, that we judge objects and events in their freedom. We 
don’t have to hold these truths to be self-evident any more than we have to hold men 
and women equal or the rose beautiful; nothing compels us. There is nothing nec-
essary in what we hold. That we do so hold is an expression of our freedom. In the 
judgment, we discover the nature and limits of what we hold in common. This ›who‹ 
shows itself in the political judgments we make daily and, with them, in the company 
we choose to keep, the sense of community we feel. This is the simple but crucial les-
son that we can learn from Arendt’s aesthetic account of political judgment.
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